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Summary
There is no consensus among experts in and outside the U.S. government about
the magnitude of the threat to U.S. national interests posed by the Al Qaeda
organization.  Virtually all experts agree that Al Qaeda and its sympathizers retain
the intention to conduct major attacks in the United States, against U.S. interests
abroad, and against Western countries.  
In assessing capabilities, many believe that the Al Qaeda organization and its
leadership are  no longer as relevant to assessing the global Islamic terrorist threat as
they  were on September 11, 2001.  Some believe U.S. and allied counter efforts have
weakened Al Qaeda’s central leadership structure and capabilities to the point where
Al Qaeda serves more as inspiration than as an actual terrorism planning and
execution hub.  According to this view, the threat from Al Qaeda has been replaced
by a threat from a number of loosely affiliated cells and groups that subscribe to Al
Qaeda’s ideology but have little, if any, contact with remaining Al Qaeda leaders.
Those who take this view believe that catastrophic attacks similar to those on
September 11, 2001 are unlikely because terrorist operations on that scale require a
high degree of coordination.  
An alternate view is that the remaining Al Qaeda leadership remains in contact
with, and possibly even in control of  numerous Islamic militant cells and groups
that continue to commit acts of terrorism, such as the July 7, 2005 bombings of the
London underground transportation system.  According to those who subscribe to
this view, Al Qaeda as an organization has not been weakened to the degree that
some Administration officials assert, and the global effort against Islamic  terrorism
would benefit significantly from finding and capturing Al Qaeda founder Osama bin
Laden and his top associate, Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Subscribers to this view believe
that a coordinated attack on the scale of September 11 should not be ruled out
because the remaining Al Qaeda structure is sufficiently well-organized to conduct
an effort of that magnitude.  
This paper will focus on the Al Qaeda organization and its major  affiliates, but
not the full spectrum of like-minded Islamist cells or groups that might exist.  This
report will be updated as warranted by developments.  See also CRS Report
RL32759, Al Qaeda: Statements and Evolving Ideology.
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Al Qaeda: Profile and Threat Assessment
This report analyzes the threat to U.S. security posed by the Al Qaeda
organization.  The State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2004
deems the organization  as “the most prominent component” of  a global movement
of Islamic militants that has “adopted the ideology and targeting strategies of [Al
Qaeda founder Osama] bin Laden and other senior Al Qaeda leaders.”1  This report
will not analyze all Al Qaeda-inspired movements worldwide, but it will address Al
Qaeda’s relationship with some of its known affiliates.  
Origins of Al Qaeda
The primary founder of Al Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, was born in July 1957, the
seventeenth of twenty sons of a Saudi construction magnate of Yemeni origin.  Many
Saudis are conservative Sunni Muslims, and bin Laden appears to have adopted
militant Islamist views while studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah,
Saudi Arabia.  There he studied Islam under Muhammad Qutb, brother of Sayyid
Qutb, the key ideologue of a major Sunni Islamist movement, the Muslim
Brotherhood.2  Another of bin Laden’s instructors was Dr. Abdullah al-Azzam, a
major figure in the Jordanian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Azzam is
identified by some experts as the intellectual architect of the jihad against the 1979-
1989 Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and ultimately of Al Qaeda itself; he cast the
Soviet invasion as an attempted conquest by a non-Muslim power of sacred Muslim
territory and people.3  
Bin Laden went to Afghanistan shortly after the December 1979 Soviet
invasion,  joining Azzam there.  He reportedly used some of his personal funds4 to
establish himself as a donor to the Afghan mujahedin and a recruiter of Arab and
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other Islamic volunteers for the war.  In 1984, Azzam and bin Laden structured this
assistance by establishing a network of recruiting and fund-raising offices in the Arab
world, Europe, and the United States.  That network was called the Maktab al-
Khidamat (Services Office), also known as Al Khifah; many experts consider the
Maktab to be the organizational forerunner of Al Qaeda.  Another major figure who
utilized the Maktab network to recruit for the anti-Soviet jihad was Umar Abd al-
Rahman (also known as “the blind shaykh”), the spiritual leader of radical Egyptian
Islamist group Al Jihad.  Bin Laden apparently also fought in the anti-Soviet war,
participating in a 1986 battle in Jalalabad and, more notably, a 1987 frontal assault
by foreign volunteers against Soviet armor.  Bin Laden has said he was exposed to
a Soviet chemical attack and slightly injured in that battle.5
During this period, most U.S. officials perceived the volunteers as positive
contributors to the effort to expel Soviet forces from Afghanistan, and U.S. officials
made no apparent effort to stop the recruitment of the non-Afghan volunteers for the
war.  U.S. officials have repeatedly denied that the United States directly supported
the volunteers.6  The United States did covertly finance (about $3 billion during
1981-1991) and arm (via Pakistan) the Afghan mujahedin factions, particularly the
Islamic fundamentalist Afghan factions, fighting Soviet forces.  By almost all
accounts, it was the Afghan mujahedin factions, not the Arab volunteer fighters, that
were decisive in persuading the Soviet Union to pull out of Afghanistan.  During this
period, neither bin Laden, Azzam, nor Abd al-Rahman was known to have openly
advocated, undertaken, or planned any direct attacks against the United States,
although they all were critical of U.S. support for Israel in the Middle East.  
In 1988, toward the end of the Soviet occupation, bin Laden, Azzam, and other
associates began contemplating how, and to what end, to utilize the Islamist
volunteer network they had organized.  U.S. intelligence estimates of the size of that
network was about 10,000 - 20,000; however,  not all of these necessarily supported
or participated in Al Qaeda terrorist activities.7  Azzam apparently wanted this “Al
Qaeda” (Arabic for “the base”) organization — as they began terming the
organization in 1988 — to become an Islamic “rapid reaction force,” available to
intervene wherever Muslims were perceived to be threatened.  Bin Laden differed
with Azzam, hoping instead to dispatch the Al Qaeda activists to their home
countries to try to topple secular, pro-Western Arab leaders, such as President Hosni
Mubarak of Egypt and Saudi Arabia’s royal family.  
Some attribute the bin Laden-Azzam differences to the growing influence on bin
Laden of the Egyptians in his inner circle, such as Abd al-Rahman, who wanted to
use Al Qaeda’s resources to install an Islamic state in Egypt.  Another close Egyptian
confidant was Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, operational leader of Al Jihad in Egypt.  Like
Abd al-Rahman, Zawahiri had been imprisoned but ultimately acquitted for the
October 1981 assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and he permanently
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left Egypt for Afghanistan in 1985.  There, he used his medical training to tend to
wounded fighters in the anti-Soviet war.  In November 1989, Azzam was
assassinated, and some allege that bin Laden might have been responsible for the
killing to resolve this power struggle.  Following Azzam’s death, bin Laden gained
control of the Maktab’s funds and organizational mechanisms.  Abd al-Rahman came
to the United States in 1990 from Sudan and was convicted in October 1995 for
terrorist plots related to the February 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in
New York.  Zawahiri stayed with bin Laden and remains bin Laden’s main strategist
today.
The Threat Unfolds
The August 2, 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait apparently turned bin Laden from
a  de-facto U.S. ally against the Soviet Union into one of its most active adversaries.
Bin Laden had returned home to Saudi Arabia in 1989, after the completion of the
Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan that February.  While back home, he lobbied
Saudi officials not to host U.S. combat troops to defend Saudi Arabia against an Iraqi
invasion, arguing instead for the raising of a “mujahedin”army to oust Iraq from
Kuwait.  His idea was rebuffed by the Saudi leadership as impractical, causing bin
Laden’s falling out with the royal family, and 500,000 U.S. troops deployed to Saudi
Arabia to oust Iraqi forces from Kuwait in “Operation Desert Storm” (January 16 -
February 28, 1991).  About 6,000 U.S. forces, mainly Air Force, remained in the
Kingdom during 1991-2003 to conduct operations to contain Iraq.  Although the
post-1991 U.S. force in Saudi Arabia was relatively small and confined to Saudi
military facilities, bin Laden and his followers painted the U.S. forces as occupiers
of sacred Islamic ground and the Saudi royal family as facilitator of that
“occupation.”  
In 1991, after his rift with the Saudi leadership, bin Laden relocated to Sudan,
buying property there which he used to  host and train Al Qaeda militants — this
time, for use against the United States and its interests, as well as for jihad operations
in the Balkans, Chechnya, Kashmir, and the Philippines.  During the early 1990s, he
also reportedly funded Saudi Islamist dissidents in London, including Saad Faqih,
organized as the  “Movement for Islamic Reform in Arabia (MIRA).”8  Bin Laden
himself remained in Sudan  until the Sudanese government, under U.S. and Egyptian
pressure, expelled him in May 1996; he then returned to Afghanistan and helped the
Taliban gain and maintain control of Afghanistan.  (The Taliban captured Kabul in
September 1996.) 
Bin Laden and Zawahiri apparently believed that the only way to bring Islamic
regimes to power was to oust from the region the perceived backer of secular regional
regimes, the United States.  During the 1990s, bin Laden and Zawahiri transformed
Al Qaeda into a global threat to U.S. national security, culminating in the September
11, 2001 attacks.  By this time, Al Qaeda had become a coalition of factions of
radical Islamic groups operating throughout the Muslim world, mostly groups
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opposing their governments.  Cells and associates have been located in over 70
countries, according to U.S. officials.  
The pre-September 11 roster of attacks against the United States that are widely
attributed to Al Qaeda included the following: 
 ! In 1992, Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for bombing a hotel in
Yemen where 100 U.S. military personnel were awaiting
deployment to Somalia for Operation Restore Hope.  No one was
killed.
 ! A growing body of information about central figures in the February
1993 bombing of the World Trade Center in New York, particularly
the reputed key bomb maker Ramzi Ahmad Yusuf, suggests possible
Al Qaeda involvement.  As noted above, Abd al-Rahman was
convicted for plots related to this attack.
 ! Al Qaeda claimed responsibility for arming Somali factions who
battled U.S. forces there in October 1993, and who killed 18 U.S.
special operations forces in Mogadishu in October 1993.
 ! In June 1995, in Ethiopia, members of Al Qaeda allegedly aided the
Egyptian militant Islamic Group in a nearly successful assassination
attempt against the visiting Mubarak.
 ! The four Saudi nationals who confessed to a November 1995
bombing of a U.S. military advisory facility in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
claimed on Saudi television to have been inspired by bin Laden and
other radical Islamist leaders.  Five Americans were killed in that
attack.
 ! The September 11 Commission report indicated that Al Qaeda might
have had a hand in the June 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers
complex near Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.  However, then director of the
FBI Louis Freeh previously attributed that attack primarily to Saudi
Shiite dissidents working with Iranian agents.  Nineteen U.S. airmen
were killed.
 ! Al Qaeda allegedly was responsible for the August 1998 bombings
of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, which killed about 300.
On August 20, 1998, the United States launched a cruise missile
strike against bin Laden’s training camps in Afghanistan, reportedly
missing him by a few hours.
 ! In December 1999, U.S. and Jordanian authorities separately
thwarted related Al Qaeda plots against religious sites in Jordan and
apparently against the Los Angeles international airport.
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Al Qaeda’s Evolution Post-September 11  
After the 1998 embassy bombings, the Clinton Administration began to exert
pressure on Al Qaeda’s host, the Taliban regime of Afghanistan.  On August 20,
1998, two weeks after those attacks, the United States launched cruise missile strikes
against an Al Qaeda camp in an attempt to hit bin Laden, but the strike apparently
missed him by a few hours.9  In July 1999, President Clinton imposed a ban on U.S.
trade with Taliban-controlled Afghanistan and froze Taliban assets in the United
States.  On  December 19, 2000, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 banned any
arms shipments or provision of military advice to the Taliban.  The Clinton
Administration also pursued a number of covert operations against bin Laden during
1999-2000, and the Bush Administration considered some new options prior to
September 11, including arming anti-Taliban opposition groups.10  
The September 11 attacks instilled greater urgency in the U.S. effort against Al
Qaeda.  Although U.S. officials say that the post-September 11 struggle against Al
Qaeda uses all aspects of U.S. national power (legal, economic, diplomatic, as well
as military), a cornerstone of the post-September 11 U.S. effort has been the military
effort in Afghanistan.  The  U.S.-led war succeeded in ousting the Taliban regime
there (December 2001) and replacing it with a pro-U.S., moderate government.
Approximately 18,000 U.S. troops remain in and around Afghanistan, searching for
remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban leaders and fighters.  However, bin Laden and
Zawahiri are not widely believed to be in Afghanistan proper; they reportedly
escaped from their redoubt in the Tora Bora mountains (near the city of Khost)
during the war and, according to most assessments, fled into Pakistan.  Central
Intelligence Agency paramilitary officers and other U.S. personnel (some as
contractors) in Pakistan are dedicated to this search,11 assisting Pakistani forces and
agents.  Acting on the assumption that bin Laden and Zawahiri are in remote areas
of Pakistan rather than in or around urban areas, in March 2004, Pakistan deployed
about 70,000 troops against suspected Al Qaeda hiding places in the South
Waziristan region, but failed to find the two, or any other major Al Qaeda figures.
Current Pakistani military operations are centered around North Waziristan.  There
are very few indications of their whereabouts, but, in Time Magazine’s June 27, 2005
issue, Director of Central Intelligence Porter Goss said that the United States had an
“excellent idea” where bin Laden was,  but he did not specify any exact location.
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White House spokesman Scott McLellan subsequently clarified the Goss comment
to reflect less certainty than Goss indicated.12 
Some experts believe the two might be in settled areas, perhaps even a large
Pakistani city.  The videotaped statements by the two, released over the past six
months, appear to demonstrate that they have access to technology and physical
infrastructure.  Many of the 15 top Al Qaeda operatives captured or killed since
September 11 — of the 37 such operatives identified after September 11 — have
been found in urban areas.  These include number three leader Mohammad Atef,
killed in Kabul, Afghanistan by U.S. Predator;  September 11 planner Khalid Shaikh
Mohammed,  arrested by Pakistani agents near Rawalpindi; key recruiter and planner
Abu Zubaydah,  arrested by Pakistani agents in Faisalabad;  September 11 plotter
Ramzi bin al-Shibh,  arrested by Pakistani agents in Karachi; and Abu Faraj al-Libbi,
arrested by Pakistani forces near Peshawar in May 2005.  Al Libbi is  perceived as
an operative who has risen in the organization since September 11, but some question
al-Libbi’s seniority and importance to recent Al Qaeda plotting.13 
Other senior Al Qaeda leaders have been found outside Pakistan or Afghanistan.
Hanbali (Riduan Isammudin), a key operative of Al Qaeda- affiliate Jemaah
Islamiyah was arrested in Thailand.  Abdul Ali al-Harithi, a key plotter, was killed
by a U.S. Predator strike in Yemen.  In the aggregate, since the September 11 attacks,
about 3,000 suspected Al Qaeda members have been detained or arrested by about
90 countries, of which 650 are under U.S. control. 
Some other senior figures are apparently beyond U.S. reach.  Al Qaeda
spokesman Suleiman Abu Ghaith, operations planner Sayf al-Adl, and bin Laden’s
son Saad are believed to be in Iran.  Iran has acknowledged publicly that it has some
senior Al Qaeda figures “in custody” — without naming them specifically — but Iran
has refused to transfer them to their countries of origin for interrogation and trial.14
Many doubt the degree of constraint, if any, that Iran has placed on them, and the
Bush Administration has publicly alleged that the three were responsible for planning
the May 2003 suicide attacks on a housing complex in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.  If true,
this would  suggest that the three are in contact with Al Qaeda operatives outside
Iran.  Some might argue that, if these three senior figures are able to communicate
with bin Laden and Zawahiri, a major portion of the core of the Al Qaeda leadership
as it existed on September 11, 2001 is still operating and possibly in control of
ongoing operations.15  Those who take this view tend to believe that the United States
should exert greater efforts to capture bin Laden and Zawahiri on the grounds that
they remain pivotal leadership figures and that their capture would greatly deflate the
organization. 
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Another view is that the Al Qaeda organization, as it still exists, is less central
to the overall Islamic terrorist threat faced by the United States than it was at the time
of the September 11 attacks.  Reflecting this view, the State Department report on
terrorism for 2004 (p. 7) says, as do many experts, that:
... the core of al-Qa’ida has suffered damage to its leadership, organization, and
capabilities...At the same time, al-Qa’ida has spread its anti-U.S., anti-Western
ideology to other groups and geographical areas.  It is therefore no longer only
al-Qa’ida itself but increasingly groups affiliated with al-Qa’ida, or
independent ones adhering to al-Qa’ida’s ideology, that present the greatest
threat of terrorist attacks against U.S. and allied interests globally.  
Al Qaeda’s evolution since September 11 could change the nature of the threat
posed by the organization.  Many believe that the weakening of central direction
renders Al Qaeda less able to conduct catastrophic attacks inside the United States
because its diffusion limits its ability to orchestrate  complicated, coordinated plots
similar to the September 11, 2001 attacks.  The Bush Administration asserts that the
absence of attacks inside the United States since September 11 demonstrates that the
main thrust of Administration policy is succeeding.  However, it could be argued that
more autonomous affiliates might be better able to adapt attacks to local conditions
and goals, making them a major collective threat.  Younger Al Qaeda figures, some
of whom fled the Afghanistan battlefield, are said to be emerging as major planners,
and these activists apparently see Al Qaeda as inspiration rather than as a structured
organization.  According to this view, bin Laden and Zawahiri are far less
operationally relevant than they were at the time of September 11 and U.S. and allied
counter-terrorist efforts might be better spent on countering the ideology that is
promoted by Al Qaeda.  Experts have advanced some ideas for doing so, including
enhanced U.S. public diplomacy and stepped up efforts to engage moderate Islamic
clerics in the Islamic world to enlist them in an effort to de-legitimize Al Qaeda’s
tactics.  
Al Qaeda’s Partners and Supporters
Some experts believe that Al Qaeda is not significantly more diffuse than it was
prior to the September 11 attacks.  Al Qaeda has always been more a coalition of
different groups than a unified structure, many argue, and it has been this diversity
that gives Al Qaeda global reach — the ability to act in many different places and to
pose a multiplicity of hard-to-predict threats.  In most cases, the degree of
involvement, if any, by bin Laden, Zawahiri, or other known Al Qaeda leaders in the
operations of these diverse groups has never been  precisely known.  Some major
groups were part of  the Al Qaeda coalition before September 11,16 and most remain
active and still associated with Al Qaeda today, to varying degrees, are as follows:
 ! the Islamic Group and Al Jihad (Egypt).  Zawahiri was the
operational and political leader of Al Jihad before he “merged” it
with Al Qaeda in 1998;  
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 ! the Armed Islamic Group and the Salafist Group for Call and
Combat (Algeria);
 ! the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU).  This group has been
less active since its military commander, Juma Namangani, was
killed by a U.S. airstrike on fighters at Konduz, Afghanistan in
November 2001;  
 ! the Jemaah Islamiyah (Indonesia).17  This group allegedly was
responsible for the  attack on a Bali nightclub in October 2002 that
killed 180 persons; 
 ! the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Libyan opposition);
 ! and Harakat ul-Mujahedin, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,
and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi  (Kashmiri militant groups based in
Pakistan);18 and
 ! Asbat al-Ansar (Lebanon).  
Emerging Al Qaeda Affiliates: Iraq.  Since the September 11 attacks, some
other Al Qaeda affiliates  have been established or publicly identified, and they have
been active.  One notable example is the Al Qaeda Jihad Organization in
Mesopotamia, headed by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a 38-year-old Jordanian Arab who
reportedly fought in Afghanistan.  The group, which is designated as a Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO), consists of foreign volunteers fighting alongside Iraqi
insurgents against U.S.-led and Iraqi forces.  It is an offshoot of another group called
Ansar al-Islam, which is named as an FTO, and was based in Kurdish-controlled
northern Iraq prior to the U.S.-led war to oust Saddam Hussein.  Ansar al-Islam,
which consists of both Islamist Kurds and Arabs, is said to be continuing to operate
in Iraq under the banner of a group called Ansar al-Sunna, although some see this as
a distinct group.
Although Zarqawi reputedly sees himself as a potential leader of Islamic forces
in his own right, in 2004 he formally swore fealty to bin Laden and affiliated with Al
Qaeda.19  Some maintain that Zarqawi is successfully stoking Muslim opposition to
the U.S. intervention in Iraq to recruit Muslim fighters not only for combat in Iraq,
but possibly also for terrorist operations in  other Western countries and in other
Middle Eastern countries, including his native Jordan.20  In this view, which
reportedly is shared by the Central Intelligence Agency in a recent assessment, the
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U.S. involvement in Iraq has strengthened rather than weakened groups connected
to or influenced by Al Qaeda. The reputed CIA assessment says that Iraq is now
playing a role similar to that of Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation - a training
ground for Islamic militants who might travel elsewhere after the Iraq conflict winds
down.21  Zarqawi’s formal affiliation with bin Laden gives some support to the view
that the remaining Al Qaeda leaders might be trying to rebuild the organizational
structure of Al Qaeda before its leadership was ousted from Afghanistan in late 2001.
Other Affiliates. A range of other terrorist groups that have not been formally
named as Foreign Terrorist Organizations are  associated with Al Qaeda, according
the State Department.  These groups, either in partnership with Al Qaeda or on their
own, are attempting to destabilize established regimes in the region.  These include
the Islamic Army of Aden (Yemen), and Hizb-e-Islam/Gulbuddin), named after
radical Afghan faction leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar.  The latter  group is fighting
against the government of President Hamid Karzai, the leader of post-Taliban
Afghanistan.  Another such pro-Al Qaeda organization is the  Moroccan Islamic
Combatant Group, which allegedly was responsible for a suicide bomb attack against
five sites in Casablanca killing about 40 people in May 2003.  According to the State
Department report for 2004 (p.52), Spanish authorities are also investigating the
possibility that members of the group were behind the March 11, 2004 bombings of
commuter trains in Madrid, which killed 191 persons.22  
Another group, “Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula,” is believed to consist of
Al Qaeda or pro-Al Qaeda fighters seeking to overthrow the ruling Al Saud family
in Saudi Arabia.  The faction has claimed responsibility for the December 6, 2004
attack on the U.S. consulate in Jeddah.  It also was allegedly responsible for two car
bombs that exploded outside the Interior Ministry in Riyadh on December 29, 2004.
Saudi counter-efforts have generally been effective, reducing the frequency of attacks
in Saudi Arabia in recent months.  In 2004, Saudi security forces capture or killed all
but seven of its 26 most-wanted terrorists, including the leader of the faction, Abd al-
Aziz al-Muqrin, who was killed in a raid in June 2004.  Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula is not named as an FTO and is not analyzed separately in the 2004 State
Department report on international terrorism.  
Emerging Al Qaeda Presence in Africa and Europe.  Depending on the
outcome of investigations, some of  the bombings and attempted bombings of the
London transportation system in July 2005 might support the belief in the
Administration and among some outside experts that there is a growing Al Qaeda
presence in East Africa.  Two of the suspects arrested in the failed July 21 bombings
were of East African origin, and there had been longstanding fears among Western
intelligence agencies that Al Qaeda might be recruiting or controlling cells consisting
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of East Africans for operations in Europe or elsewhere.23  Al Qaeda was allegedly
responsible for the bombing of an Israeli-owned hotel and the related firing (and near
miss) of shoulder-fired missiles at an Israeli passenger aircraft, both in Mombasa,
Kenya in November 2002.  Reflecting Administration fears about Al Qaeda’s
expansion in Africa, the U.S. military has begun a program to train the militaries of
nine African nations to prevent infiltration by terrorist groups, particularly Al
Qaeda.24  
It is not yet known to what extent, if any, the July 21 bombers might have had
links to the bombers who set off the July 7 explosions in London that killed 52
persons.  Some of those alleged perpetrators (who died in the bombings) were
British-born but of South Asian origin, but some press reports indicate that the July
7 and the July 21 bombers might have visited Pakistan simultaneously, suggesting
a possible tie between them and perhaps to the Al Qaeda leadership that is thought
to be in Pakistan.  A claim of responsibility for the July 7 attacks came from a
previously little known group called “The Secret Organization of Al Qaeda in
Europe,” a name that suggest some linkage to or affinity with Al Qaeda.  Two days
after the failed July 21 London attacks, suicide bombers in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt
killed 88 in attacks on a hotel district; an investigation is under way to determine
linkages, if any, of those attacks to Al Qaeda, to radical Islamist groups in Egypt, or
to October 2004 bombings in Taba, Egypt that killed 34 persons.
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Conclusion
The assessment of the degree and character of the threat posed by the Al Qaeda
organization might suggest strategies for combating it.  Those who believe that Al
Qaeda as an organization is marginal to the overall global Islamist threat might focus
on such policy objectives as addressing regional conflicts, promoting democracy in
the Arab world, cooperating with regional governments to prevent terrorism
financing and terrorist infiltration, and improving public diplomacy to better explain
U.S. policies in the Middle East.  On the other hand, some who believe that Al Qaeda
remains central to the Islamist terrorism threat might tend to recommend policies that
focus on finding, combating, and arresting Al Qaeda leaders and operatives that are
still at large.  Many believe that, no matter the structure and capabilities of Al Qaeda,
stabilizing Iraq will likely be crucial to reducing the recruitment of militants willing
to conduct acts of terrorism against the United States and its allies.  
Others believe that the Al Qaeda and global Islamic terrorist threat is difficult
to assess, no matter how much intelligence is shared and gathered, and that
combating Al Qaeda and its affiliates abroad could have only partial success.  Those
who take this view tend to believe that U.S. counter-efforts should focus more
intently on homeland security, stressing such measures as improving airline security,
establishing enhanced security measures for passenger train travel, and expanding
security of U.S. ports.  Some tend to favor additional powers for law enforcement to
investigate potential Islamist cells in the United States.  The latter suggestions often
trigger debate from civil liberties and American Muslim organizations who believe
that such measures will inevitably impinge on the civil liberties of Arab and Muslim
Americans through profiling and other investigative techniques.
